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‘In a very real sense, the conditions that spawned the war and inflicted gruesome 
casualties on Sierra Leone’s citizens have not disappeared’, warned the International 
Crisis Group. In this paper we argue that many of those conditions are being recreated. 
The same old men who were responsible for the war are still in power, both in 
government and in a reinstated chieftaincy system, and corruption is still endemic, while 
young people remain jobless and largely uneducated. Further, we argue that the policies 
of the international community are, perhaps inadvertently, promoting a return to pre-war 
conditions. 
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At independence from Britain in 1960, Sierra Leone was extremely poor, had a literacy 
rate of only 7.7 per cent (World Bank 2003) and had inherited a ramshackle government 
system largely based on indirect rule by over 200 paramount chiefs. The colonial 
authorities had exploited the main mineral resources and left behind a declining 
economy; even diamond production was falling as the best reserves had been worked 
out. Britain backed the Sierra Leone People’s Party, which was seen as the party of the 
chiefs and urban middle-class. When the opposition All People’s Congress won the 
1967 election, it took a series of three military coups before the elected Siaka Stevens 
was able to take his post as president. From that weak start Stevens was necessarily 
concerned with consolidating power, which led to the development of a patrimonial 
system and one-party state. Stevens retired in 1985 and passed power to a weak, hand-
picked successor, Joseph Momah. Through the 1980s the government won increasing 
support from donors, despite growing corruption and patrimonialism and collapsing 
state institutions, perhaps because it was also faithfully introducing IMF policies such as 
devaluation. By 1986, education spending was one-sixth of what it had been five years 
before; teachers were often not paid, and President Momah declared that education was 
a privilege, not a right. In Sierra Leone, privileges went through the patrimonial system, 
and young people felt increasingly excluded.  
Idealistic but unemployed and excluded young men formed the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) and in 1991 began a guerrilla war to overthrow the government. It soon 
went badly wrong, with the RUF increasingly dependent on terror and brutality, and its 
fighters were increasingly drugged and kidnapped young people. The government 
became weaker, suffered multiple coups, and was dependent on mercenaries from 
Executive Outcomes. Under heavy international pressure elections were held in 1996 in 
the hope of bringing the RUF back in; it did not work, and the RUF cut off the hands of 
many people who had voted. A weak former UN official, Ahmed Kabbah, was elected, 
and came under IMF pressure to cut spending on the military. Executive Outcomes was 
expelled and there was a coup in 1997, as the army increasingly became sobels—
soldiers by day and rebels by night. Kabbah was reinstated the following year, but the 
war continued and the RUF occupied the capital, Freetown, in 1999. 
With UN, British and Nigerian backing the RUF was finally pushed back and two 
unsuccessful ceasefires agreed. In early 2001 a ceasefire was agreed which held. Hasty 
elections in May 2002 led to the re-election of Kabbah. Demobilization and 
reconstruction, largely with British support, began in late 2001 and still continues. 
Britain is committed to a ten-year programme, which includes military and police 
training. The United National peacekeeping force, UNAMSIL, will remain in Sierra 
Leone at least until the end of 2005. Out of a population of 5.2 million, 70,000 people 
were killed, 10,000 maimed (many with limbs cut off by rebels), and half the population 
forced to flee their homes; 72,490 ex-combatants have been demobilized (Kaikai 2004; 
HRW 2005). 
Diamonds undoubtedly fuelled the war. Initially the RUF needed diamonds to pay for 
arms and other costs, but for some leaders and some rebels and sobels, diamonds 
because a way to try to get rich. But this was never a war about diamonds. An Overseas 
Development Institute Report said that, ‘the more considered view is that years of 
government neglect of education and other state services have helped to create a large 
cohort of unemployed and barely literate young people, easily conscripted by both 2 
political and criminal organizations’ (Fanthorpe 2003: 54). A World Bank (2003: 5) 
study comments that: 
It is significant that everyone we spoke to talked of the collapse of institutions 
as the root cause of the civil war, not diamonds. … The collapse resulted in a 
signal failure to provide public services equitably and an almost total failure to 
maintain a just dispute resolution system.  
In this paper, we point to a growing fear that this is happening again, and that that not 
enough is being done to redress the grievances which triggered the war in 1991. 
The desire of Sierra Leoneans to move forward is obvious. The war brought death and 
destruction without resolving any of the country’s problems. The economy and 
government institutions have been badly fractured and will require both careful 
reconstruction and a long period of healing and regrowth. Yet the country is being led 
by many of the same people who operated the patrimonial state that brought about the 
collapse of the 1990s, while the youth remain unemployed and disempowered as they 
were a decade earlier.  
In the remainder of this paper, we looks at four interlinked issues: 
−  Rushed elections and the reinstatement of the chiefdom system means that 
government is controlled by the same patrimonial, self-centred elite as a 
decade earlier; 
−  IMF spending caps prevent the essential expansion of education, and require 
civil service salaries to be so low that civil servants need additional income; 
−  Corruption cannot be tackled, both because the government does not want to, 
and because of these low salaries; and 
−  Ex-combatants do not receive enough training or money to be reintegrated 
into society. Young people remain jobless and largely uneducated and job 
creation is not a priority of donors or government. 
2  Electing the same people 
After the successful 2001 ceasefire, Britain and the United States pushed hard for early 
elections, because they backed Kabbah who they knew would be more likely to be re-
elected the earlier elections were held, because they refused to accept the RUF in a 
transitional government, and because they wanted to speed their own exits from the 
country (ICG 2001a). 
But there was widespread disagreement with this policy. ICG, the International Crisis 
Group (2001a 2001b) repeatedly called for a delay in the May 2002 elections: ‘recalling 
the hurried 1996 elections that replaced the military regime with the Kabbah 
government but ushered in the most brutal phase of the civil war, [many civil society 
activists] call for ‘peace before elections’. They argue that Sierra Leone should ensure 
that necessary foundations are in place before heading for the ballot box’ (ICG 
2001a: 3). Editorials in local newspapers called for a transitional unity government for 3 
two years before elections. Some opposition parties and civil society groups called for a 
national consultative conference that would bring together a wider range of people that 
just the old politicians and military leaders. There was deep domestic dissatisfaction, 
particularly among the younger generation, about the corrupt, aged and indifferent 
nature of its government. 
The ICG was not alone in pointing to the failure of the donor-promoted 1996 elections. 
Alfred Zack-Williams (1999) noted that:  
It is quite plausible to argue that if ‘peace had been sought before democracy’ 
and the process of national reconciliation pursued, the events of 25 May 1997 
[when the newly elected Kabbah was overthrown] might have been avoided. 
Elections have not produced stable governments in Sierra Leone, and putting Kabbah 
back in power reinstated a weak, corrupt, and partisan government. In a bitter attack on 
the government in 2003, the ICG said that the government’s ‘performance has been 
disappointing and complacency appears to have set in’. It adds that ‘there are consistent 
signs that donor dependence and the old political ways are returning’. The ICG goes 
further and points to ‘a consensus between donors and the political elite [which] may 
entirely miss the realities of ordinary people’ (ICG 2003: 1, 2004: 24). 
In March 2003 during planning for local elections, there was a broad formal 
consultation with 12,000 people at local level. One of the key recommendations was 
that special seats on district councils should be reserved for women, young people and 
the disabled. This was rejected by the Kabbah government (Moore, Squire and 
MacBailey 2003: 13). 
Despite pressure for democratization and decentralization, Kabbah convinced the 
British government to support the rebuilding of the paramount chief system, which 
traditionally was the lowest level of administration and which covered the entire country 
except the area around the capital, Freetown. It had been the basis of rule of British 
colonial authorities and then that of Siaka Stevens. Traditionally, chiefs handled dispute 
resolution and tax collection. Because of the war, 63 of the 149 paramount chiefs had 
been killed or died, and nearly all the others had fled from their areas. DfID in 2000 
established a paramount chief’s restoration programme, which, among other things, 
built houses for 50 chiefs (DfID 2002). Elections to fill the 63 vacancies were held in 
late 2002 and early 2003; taxpayers (mostly men) elect councillors who then elect the 
paramount chiefs, who hold the position for life (Malan and Meek 2003). 
Within Sierra Leone, however, there were substantial objections to the programme. 
Chiefs are seen as being an important cause of the war, through their corruption and 
alienation of the youth. As long ago as 1955-56 there were uprisings against the abuses 
of power of chiefs and their demand for illegal taxes and fees, which was described by a 
commission then as ‘a civil war rather than a disturbance’ (quoted in Fanthorpe 2003). 
The World Bank (2003: 44) reports that ‘chiefs’ rule has led to mismanagement, power 
abuse and failure to ensure the delivery of decentralized services’. DfID (2002: 35) 
notes that ‘over the last 20 or 30 years, this [customary court] system has fallen into 
decay and been the subject of considerable abuses’. It also notes that ‘customary law’ 
contains ‘inherent abuses of human rights such as the status and treatment of women’. A 
study of peace operations by the Conflict, Security and Development Group (CSDG) of 4 
King’s College, London notes that ‘bad governance at the chiefdom level had been an 
important factor in the revolt against authority and was ostensibly at the root of the 
RUF’s doctrine’ (CSDG 2003: 91). Fithen and Richards (2005) point to the importance 
of high fines in customary courts as forcing men to choose between indentured labour to 
a chief to pay off the fine, or fleeing to the diamond fields or rebel groups. Glentworth 
(2002) notes that ‘local people and particularly women and the youth are no longer 
prepared to put up with the kind of exploitation that they previously suffered’ under the 
chiefs. 
The final assessment of the government-donor post-war National Recovery Strategy 
points to the ‘need to redress the bias of customary law and social system at the village 
and chiefdom levels which protect the ‘influential’ at the expense of the poor and 
vulnerable’. In particular, the Forced Labour Ordinance of 1932 remains in force, 
allowing chiefs and their extended families to force young people and outsiders to work 
for them (Moore, Squire and MacBailey 2003: 22). 
DfID (2002: 87) admits that the chiefdom system can succeed only if there are ‘new 
relationships between the chiefs and their people. Chieftaincy can only really be 
effective and accepted if chiefs’ behaviour avoids many abuses of previous decades—
vindictive and exploitative punishments through the courts, arbitrary seizure of land and 
property, etc’. But this is not happening. Chiefs in diamond mining areas are using the 
0.75 per cent diamond tax they receive for personal gain instead of, as intended, for the 
benefit of the community (Malan and Meek 2003). Chiefs are using aid money for 
personal enrichment and to reward political supporters (Fanthorpe 2003). Chiefs are 
also complaining that the British-built houses are not grand enough and not compatible 
with their status; Paramount Chief Sigismond Caulker Quebboka told the Salone Times 
(5 Feb. 2004) that he cannot stay in a house with such small rooms and no parlour. 
The return of chiefs has brought tensions in some areas as the government also tries to 
restore civil administration. Some chiefs are refusing to cooperate with district officers 
and there are conflicts with local governments elected in 2004 (Malan 2003a; RSG 25). 
Tunde Zack-Williams (2003) argues that Britain has chosen to reify and rebuild a 
discredited feudal tradition and delay the development of grassroots democracy.  
Archibald and Richards (2002: 358, 360) note that ‘standard NGO practice in post-war 
Sierra Leone’ is to work with village development committees (VDCs). The problem is 
‘that VDCs were invariably comprised of elders and members of elites’ who excluded 
some groups and individuals. ‘In a majority of cases VDC members had registered 
themselves as the ‘most needy’ residents or (allegedly) diverted inputs to their kin 
residing in urban areas. IDPs [internally displaced persons], women and youths were 
excluded because they had no representatives (or ‘friends’) on the committee’.  
3  IMF limits to spending 
The IMF’s priority for Sierra Leone, under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF), is ‘continued maintenance of macroeconomic stability’. The IMF sets a series 
of ‘quantitative performance criteria and benchmarks’ for the PRGF; a key one of these 
is the government wage bill, which must fall from 8.4 per cent of GDP in 2002 to 7.0 
per cent in 2005 (IMF/World Bank 2002: 29, 36). In addition there is a total government 5 
budget ceiling (IMF 2003 2005). Meeting these benchmarks is a criterion for all aid. 
Britain is the largest donor to Sierra Leone, and a condition of its aid is that ‘the 
government of Sierra Leone will remain on track with the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility’ (UK/GRSL 2002: 5). 
‘Many civil servants have salaries that are close to or below the poverty threshold’, 
notes a study by the World Bank (2003: 16).The report continues that “public service 
pay is too low to attract, motivate and retain the key staff needed to improve 
performance and lead reform. Salaries of senior staff are a fraction of equivalent salaries 
in the private and parastatal sectors”. Across the board, there ‘are difficulties in hiring, 
motivating and retaining staff because of low pay as well as low skill levels’. Low pay 
leads to high vacancy rates, and the reports notes that ‘the salary issue is aggravated at 
the central and local levels by the competition among donors, including NGOs, for the 
well qualified people [who] are in very short supply because  of the brain drain during 
the war. This applies at all levels: NGOs pay teachers and health workers in the 
provinces more than the government does. … some international NGOs have hired 
some of the state’s best qualified health workers’. The report also notes that ‘there are 
few incentives to encourage staff to relocate because remote area allowances are too 
small to attract any teachers’. 
The World Bank conclusion is stark. The salary issue is critical. ‘If services are to be 
improved, the staff responsible for delivery must be much better paid than they are now’ 
(World Bank 2003: 14). But the IMF will not allow that. Indeed, the benchmark 
requires a cut in the wage bill. The IMF (2003) admits that the high wage bill is caused 
by higher-than-budgeted spending on teachers and health workers. In part, there is a 
problem with corruption—an estimated 11 per cent of teachers on the payroll do not 
exist, and parliamentarians decided to pay themselves high wages. But even dealing 
with the ghost teachers is not enough to solve the problem, because an estimated 25 per 
cent of teachers are simply not being paid, although they are still teaching (Moore, 
Squire, MacBailey 200: 44). There is little money for expansion of health and education 
services into war affected areas. 
The assessment of the National Recovery Strategy found that ‘currently the numbers of 
primary school teachers nationwide remain insufficient. An additional estimated 8000 
teachers were required in 2003, but with the Ministry of Finance’s ceiling of 25,000 
teachers (already reached) only 3000 were approved to be hired effective 2004’. Pupil-
teacher ratios have reached 118:1 in some parts of the country (Moore, Squire, 
MacBailey 2003: 43-4). Primary education is supposed to be free, ‘but there are many 
strings attached, that made education so expensive in Sierra Leone’, said Emmanuelle 
Beart, a UNICEF goodwill ambassador on a visit to Freetown (The Independent 13 Feb 
2004). An estimated 375,000 children could not attend school in 2005 (RSG 25). 
In education, salaries average US$72 per month, and in health only US$48 per month. 
(calculated from World Bank 2003). Sierra Leone has fewer teachers than the average 
for sub-Saharan Africa, and the number of health workers is ‘much lower’; 70 per cent 
of health facilities were not functioning at the end of 2001 (World Bank 2003). 
Many commentators accuse the International Monetary Fund of ignoring the war when 
it demanded that the Kabbah government cut government spending by cutting the rice 
ration to the army and ending the contract with Executive Outcomes in 1997, which 
triggered the military coup. Even the World Bank (2003: 8) cites IMF ‘pressure’ and 6 
says this ‘resulted in a renewal of violence’. By stressing the standard prescription for 
peaceful countries and ignoring the civil war implications, the IMF is accused of 
causing immense damage. Many critics feel the IMF is doing the same thing again. 
A World Bank study Breaking the Conflict Trap (Collier et al. 2003), also questioned 
some of the orthodoxy of the international financial institutions. It finds no link between 
what the World Bank defines as ‘good’ economic policy and the risk of subsequent war. 
Further, the report challenges the IMF view, namely that ‘the priority is to correct 
macroeconomic imbalances’. Instead, the study finds that ‘social policy is relatively 
more important and macroeconomic policy is relatively less important in post-conflict 
situations than in normal situations’. Indeed, economic growth actually increases if 
preference is give to ‘social policies—specifically policies for social inclusion’. High 
priority should be given to health, education and the rehabilitation of key infrastructure 
that links to rural areas. The report also points to ‘signals of intent’. High military 
expenditure signals a belief in the risk of renewed conflict, whereas broadly based, 
inclusive spending, particularly in areas which had been controlled by rebel groups, 
signals a commitment to peace and reconciliation. This, in turn, has direct economic 
effects, because peaceful signals encourage private investment. Road projects, for 
example, can have a 40 per cent rate of return (Collier et al. 2003: 137, 154-6). 
In particular, the report warns against growth-promoting policies which discriminate 
and increase grievances. Overall growth will be promoted by public expenditure in 
those areas where private activity is already reviving most rapidly, but that will have a 
high social cost. ‘The most difficult regions to revive are likely to be those that the rebel 
organization controlled’ because market forces and private activity will discriminate 
against those areas (Collier et al. 2003: 166). The study calls for ‘an explicit long-term 
strategy for intergroup redistribution’. Finally, the study warns about the ‘lethal 
cocktail’ of ‘low and declining incomes, badly distributed, [which] create a pool of 
impoverished and disaffected young men who can be cheaply recruited by 
“entrepreneurs of violence” ’(Collier et al. 2003: 4, 140) This has already happened 
once in Sierra Leone, and could happen again. 
The World Bank study seems to suggest that Sierra Leone should worry less about 
macro-economic balances than the IMF demands, and spend more rapidly on 
reconstruction in rural areas and on finding jobs for impoverished and disaffected youth.  
4 Corruption 
Endemic corruption was one cause of the war, and Britain is supporting an anti-
corruption commission. But there are warnings that this may be ineffective. At high 
level, the government does not seem to back the programme; the ICG (2004: 24, 8) says 
that ‘the judicial system … has shown itself unwilling or unable to go after corrupt 
officials’. Indeed, the ICG accuses donors and diplomats of ‘turning a blind eye to local 
corruption and exercising influence through coalitions with old power elites while 
marginalizing those truly interested in reform’. 
Members of the anti-corruption commission complained about government interference 
in late 2001. At the start of 2002, the anti-corruption commission indicted three of the 
five national election commissioners, but the Kabbah government refused to prosecute 7 
them. The European Union withheld €2 million that was to be used for 2004 local 
elections because the Electoral Commission has not accounted for EC funds for the 
2002 general elections (MacJohnson 2004). 
And the government is cracking down on its critics. Three journalists who wrote about 
alleged government corruption were jailed for ‘seditious libel’ in October 2004 and May 
2005. 
Meanwhile, at lower levels, the poverty wages imposed by the IMF force civil servants 
to find additional sources of income, meaning they steal time or money, or demand 
bribes. A British study warned that ‘salaries and allowances for the Sierra Leone civil 
service are much below reasonable living costs, not only de-motivating officials but 
creating the necessity of additional jobs or supplementary corrupt earnings’ (DfID 2002: 
30). The World Bank (2003: 26) reports that ‘corruption in the health systems seems to 
affect most public and private services’ and that ‘there are allegations of extensive 
corruption practices by teachers demanding bribes and favours in exchange for school 
enrolment and exams’. But DfID (2002: 30) admits that the required ‘large across-the-
board salary increases are ruled out by the strictures of the IMF’. 
In mid-2003, the ICG cited the necessity to reform ministries and government 
institutions to reduce corruption and promote development. ‘Unfortunately there have 
been only cosmetic changes. Institutions still lack credibility and accountability, which 
has reduced popular confidence over the past year’ (ICG 2003: 19). 
Both UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the ICG have pointed to the government’s 
inability, or perhaps unwillingness, to gain control over illegal diamond mining (RSG, 
17, 25; ICG 2003). Mine monitors earn so little that they have rapidly been corrupted. It 
would appear that less than half, and perhaps as little as one-sixth, of diamonds are 
passing through official channels. 
5  Where are the jobs? 
A growing concern is the return of the very problem that started this brutal war more 
than a decade earlier—unemployed and poorly educated youth with no jobs and no 
future. ‘A particular challenge for Sierra Leone society and the government is how to 
manage the expectations of the country’s young people, and in particular to prevent 
them from feeling a sense of exclusion’, wrote the UN Secretary-General. By late 2002 
he was warning that donors were failing to provide money for the programme to 
reintegrate former combatants, who would simply return to fighting, either in Sierra 
Leone or in neighbouring Liberia (RSG 15: 15, 17). And this happened. 
Porter (2003: 50) notes that donors’ ‘parsimony towards peacebuilding activities 
appears highly incoherent, in view of the high sum invested in UNAMSIL’. The total 
cost to the international community is likely to be nearly US$4 billion by the end of 
2005—US$800 per Sierra Leonean. But the tiny reintegration programme was 
repeatedly short of donor funds, which one UN official described as ‘incredibly 
frustrating and short-sighted’. 
The hope was that many fighters would settle as farmers. But ‘Sierra Leone’s 
government and its international partners still do not take the sector that employs some 8 
three quarters of the population seriously’, warns the ICG (2004: 15); they only pay ‘lip 
service’ to agriculture. There has been virtually no support, especially for those who 
want to grow rice, the staple crop. Roads remain poor and there is no credit. 
International insistence on removing trade barriers means that cheap Asian rice swamps 
the local market and small farmers cannot compete. And there have been no attempts to 
deal with the serious land tenure problems caused by chiefs’ right to confiscate the land 
of young men.  
Not surprisingly, this mean ex-combatants want jobs and do not want to be farmers. Yet 
there is a total lack of job opportunities, leading some ‘frustrated ex-combatants to sell 
their tool kits’ which they received after training. The ISS study confirms that the three 
month training is much too short to teach a trade. ‘The reality is in fact that many ex-
combatants have little prospect of securing productive work when they return to their 
communities’. At the same time, there is growing community resentment at what is seen 
as special treatment for ex-combatants, and that those who committed atrocities are 
being rewarded (Ginifer 2003: 48). 
There has also been widespread criticism of the limited nature of the retraining ex-
combatants have been given. Too many have been trained for tailoring, tie-dying, and 
soap-making, when there is not a sufficient local market. It has been assumed that 
people will have to go into the informal sector and create their own jobs. But the 
CSDG’s study found that ‘the length of the tuition periods has been insufficient to 
provide the skills necessary for an individual to launch a small, sustainable business’ 
(CSDG 2003: 126). 
The International Crisis Group (ICG) warned that ‘the rank and file combatant has 
effectively been promised an alternative livelihood in return for embracing peace. 
Conflict is traded for development’. Ex-combatants’ ‘high expectations of acquiring 
skills, a job and a livelihood threaten to precipitate a crisis of expectations as they 
discover a country which is more destitute and lacking in opportunity than before they 
went to war’. And ICG warns that ‘the international community has promised 
combatants what they were after all along—a livelihood’ (ICG 2001b: 14). 
In its study of Sierra Leone, the South African Institute of Security Studies (ISS) warns 
that ‘improving education opportunities has been seen as particularly important, as 36 
per cent of ex-combatants surveyed never attended school’. Indeed, the lack of 
educational opportunities was an important cause of the civil war. Yet there remains a 
severe lack of school places and few ex-combatants were given to opportunity of 
primary or secondary education (Ginifer 2003: 44; HRW 2005). 
The ISS study suggests an increase in public works schemes, especially ones with some 
training component, and praises a handful of projects for building roads and local police 
stations and post offices. UNAMSIL soldiers have also employed ex-combatants on 
road-building projects, partly as part of a conscious policy of high visibility, quick 
impact projects to give credibility to peacebuilding (Ginifer 2003; Malan 2003a). The 
final assessment of the ‘National Recovery Strategy’ points to the ‘lack of progress’ in 
rehabilitating primary and feeder roads, and also says that ‘willing groups or gangs of 
youth should be used as much as possible in support of employment creation’. Labour 
intensive technologies and local resources should be used for road maintenance and 
building, in order to generate jobs (Moore, Squire and MacBailey 2003: 11, 69, 70). 9 
The government of Sierra Leone’s IMF-agreed ‘Memorandum of Economic and 
Financial Policies’ states that ‘a key finding’ of a joint private/public sector review of 
factors affecting private sector development in Sierra Leone ‘is that the country’s 
competitiveness is seriously adversely affected by the high cost and unreliability of 
services (telecommunications, electricity, etc) and a grossly inadequate infrastructure’ 
(IMF 2003). This is a point similar to the one made more generally by the recent World 
Bank study Breaking the Conflict Trap (Collier, et al. 2003). But rather than rebuilding 
war damaged infrastructure, the IMF answer is privatization of public enterprises. 
Mobile telephones are helping to fill the telecommunications gap, but roads cannot be 
privatized and who will repair them? 
The final assessment of the ‘national recovery strategy’ is caustic about its failures. ‘The 
questionable progress on infrastructure rehabilitation and development is a cause for 
concern. … Productive (agriculture and mining) areas remain ubiquitously difficult to 
access. Crucial line ministries are being made vacuous to the point of non-functionality’ 
because donors are bypassing ministries and setting up alternative mechanisms for 
project implementation (Moore, Squire and MacBailey 2003: iii). 
6  Is there a security threat? 
No one in Sierra Leone wants a return to what is widely seen as a pointless war. 
Nevertheless, a history of coups and violence and a lack of alternatives is leading to 
worries of insecurity. Kofi Annan warned in 2005 that  
the greatest danger to peace and security in the country may emanate from civil 
unrest resulting from lack of improvement in the economy and the general 
living standards of the majority of the population (RSG 25: 13–14). 
The assessment of the ‘National Recovery Strategy’ concludes that ‘there are more 
jobless youths, women and men roaming the streets of major towns and in the 
countryside today than before the war’. It continues:  
Economic inequities continue to exist. The national economy cannot engage 
the ex-combatants who have been demobilized and other jobless citizens. 
Economic disparities and inequalities, fuelled by blatant corruption and 
decisionmakers that seem trapped in crisis management mode, continue to 
characterise social-dynamics in the country. This could constitute flash points 
of conflict in future (Moore, Squire and MacBailey 2003: iv, vi). 
A study by the South African ISS (Malan et al. 2003: executive summary: 2) warns: 
Securing employment of ex-combatants, many of whom do not have formal 
training, represents a major challenge. The danger of disgruntled ex-
combatants drifting into criminality or even renewed conflict remains a 
potential threat. 
The CSDG’s study says that ‘the reintegration programme has been worryingly 
inadequate’ and warns that ‘most of the RUF’s personnel, a large number of whom were 
abducted at school age from regional urban centres, still lack the necessary skills to 
make any positive and sustainable contribution to the economy. Such great numbers of 10 
socially and economically excluded young people imply a risk of future political 
instability. … [T]he same young people who fought together now frequently live in 
proximity to one another. It is not impossible they could reassemble under certain 
circumstances’ (CSDG 2003: 87, 96). Indeed, several thousand young men (and 
women) went on to fight for all sides in neighbouring Liberia, and in 2005 there were 
groups of ex-combatants just waiting to be called to fight in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Guinea or Sierra Leone itself. 
The ISS study warns that ‘economic stagnation and a lack of infrastructure creation also 
seem to be factors hurting both Sierra Leone and the reintegration process. If there are 
failures to deliver in these areas over the medium to long term, there may well be 
increasing criminality and tensions among the ex-combatants, with consequences   
for Sierra Leone’s future. Furthermore, reconciliation is not deep-rooted. In an unstable 
Sierra Leone these could be worrying factors for peace in the country’ (Ginifer 
2003: 51). 
Britain has become the dominant donor in Sierra Leone. Its support through IMATT 
(International Military Advisory and Training Team) is not simply training the armed 
forces, but trying to completely reconstruct the ministry of defence (MoD) and the 
military apparatus. Previously the MoD was run by the military for its own benefit 
(which was one reason for the multiple coup attempts); IMATT is attempting to change 
the entire culture, creating civilian control and loyalty to the government of the day, 
probity, and a respect for human rights. 
But can the new army be trusted? Perhaps most worrying was that 85 per cent of the 
army did not vote for Kabbah; most supported Johnny Paul Koroma, who led a failed 
coup in early 2003 (World Bank 2003). ICG (2003) estimated that only 60 per cent of 
the army is loyal to the government. There is a growing fear that when the UNAMSIL 
mission finishes at the end of 2005, the tradition of military coups could resume. For the 
newly retrained military, salaries are low and living condition poor. Some soldiers are 
only staying in the army because there are no other jobs. Some soldiers are reported to 
be selling equipment, ammunition, fuel and even uniforms (ICG 2003). Soldiers and 
police have set up roadblocks to extort money from travellers; soldiers on the beach at 
Freetown have put pressure on foreigners to give them money; some members of the 
new RSLAF have used their arms for robberies (Malan 2003b; Conteh 2003).  
In private discussions in February 2004, IMATT officers were increasingly concerned 
about a growing gap between junior officers, who they see as more honest and patriotic, 
and senior officers who maintained the patronage and authoritarian attitudes of the 
previous era. The possibility of a junior officers coup was openly discussed. British 
officers thought this could be prevented because IMATT was keeping ‘a hand on the 
tiller’ and that IMATT would probably discover and block any coup attempt. 
7  A restive youth 
The ICG (2003: 24) pointed to the growing number of youth groups. Some are bettering 
the communities through work projects, but many have incorporated former armed 
elements and could ‘pose a threat to peace and stability if they become more militant 
and more radical in pursuing redress for their grievances’.  11 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan points out that: 
The large number of unemployed youths, mainly concentrated in urban and 
mining centres throughout the country, present another long term issue. In 
addition to being a security problem, they are regularly interfering in diamond 
mining. Some youths appear to enjoy political patronage, and the Sierra Leone 
police seem to be reluctant or unable to challenge the undermining of state 
authority by these groups (RSG 17: 2).  
Richards notes that ‘War has spread and become endemic in Sierra Leone because 
combat, while not the preferred option for so many young people … is their only means 
of survival’ (Fithen and Richards 2005). He notes, ‘The civil war in Sierra Leone 
mobilized people marginalized by poverty, educational disadvantage, and injustice. If 
social exclusion was a cause of war, then peace requires society to be re-formed along 
more inclusive lines’ (Richards 1999). 
‘Durable solutions to the Sierra Leone crisis will have to pay attention to the basic 
weaknesses that made the country vulnerable to war. Rebuilding basic rural education is 
a clear priority. But equal attention is needed to creating rural employment opportunities 
outside the diamond economy. Basic education is no good unless it leads to work and 
respect’, argues Richards (2001). ‘The danger is that the lack of opportunity that drove 
young people into the ranks of the RUF is likely to persist, and the frustration that it 
generates boils over once again’, warns the Conflict, Security and Development 
Group’s study (CSDG 2003: 87). 
In 2004 there was an explosion of pop music criticizing the politicians; ‘Corruption’ by 
Daddy Saj, ‘Wake Up’ by Steady Bongo, and ‘The System (Wutehteh)’ by Jungle 
Leaders were popular. Daddy Saj’s demand that corrupt politicians should ‘pack and 
go’ became a catch phrase throughout the country. Jungle Leaders sings of young 
people unable to afford to go to school. The leadership hears the songs, but are they 
listening? One local columnist said government was simply dismissing the music as 
opposition politicians misleading the youth, and warned that ‘the songs of these 
youngsters, if not taken seriously, might bring this government down like the Biblical 
walls of Jericho’ (Kpakra-Massally 2004). 
Are the conditions that caused the war being reproduced? Will the frustration boil over 
again? Both the ICG and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan warn that the root causes of 
the war remain. Annan warned in April 2005 that just this might happen:  
Many of the key human rights issues that led to or resulted from the Sierra 
Leone conflict still persist. …  Lasting peace cannot be achieved without 
addressing the significant political, economic and social marginalization of the 
youth in Sierra Leone (ICG 2004; RSG 25: 10, 12). 
The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission in late 2004 said: 
It came to the conclusions that it was the years of bad governance, endemic 
corruption and the denial of basic human rights that created the deplorable 
conditions that made conflict inevitable. … Many of the causes of conflict that 
prompted thousands of young people to join the war have still not been 
adequately addressed (quoted in ICG 2004: 8). 12 
Conclusion 
This paper cannot make predictions. But there is worry about prioritizing rapid elections 
and the re-election of a weak, corrupt, patrimonial government over inclusion and 
transformation. The same old men are back in power, and women and young men 
are sidelined from the political process. ‘The result is a large, disgruntled   
population with time on its hands and the capacity to do both great  good and   
harm’ (ICG 2003: 23). Similarly, ‘high unemployment is one of the biggest threats to 
stability’ (ICG 2003: 28). The assessment of the National Recovery Strategy warns that 
‘the spectre of instability and civil conflict may still haunt the country’ (Moore, Squire 
and MacBailey 2003:  130). But the international community has prioritized 
macroeconomic stability over reconstruction, job creation and democratization. Though 
its economic and political policies, is the international community inadvertently 
encouraging the reproduction of the conditions that caused the war? 
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